In this paper, we analyze the implications of price setting restrictions for the conduct of cyclical fiscal and monetary policy. We consider a monetary model with monopolistic competitive firms, restrictions on the setting of prices, and government expenditures that must be financed with distortionary taxes. We show that the government is able to implement the same (frontier) set of allocations and policies, independently of the price rigidity. The environments are therefore equivalent in what concerns the price setting restrictions.
Introduction
In this paper we analyze the implications of price setting restrictions for the conduct of optimal fiscal and monetary policy. We consider, as a benchmark, a model similar to the one in Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991) , with minor differences. The model is a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model with labor only, where households hold money because they are constrained to do so, monopolistic competitive firms set flexible prices and a government finances exogenous government expenditures with state contingent taxes and monetary policy. This standard flexible price economy is compared to economies where firms are restricted in setting prices, but are otherwise identical. We characterize the sets of equilibrium allocations and corresponding fiscal and monetary policies that finance exogenous government expenditures, i.e., the sets of implementable allocations and policies.
The main result of the paper is that whether prices are flexible or sticky, whether these are set in advance or staggered, the economies share the same set of (frontier) implementable allocations and policies, and therefore also the same Ramsey optimal allocation and corresponding fiscal and monetary policy. The fiscal policy instruments that are required to achieve this result are consumption and labor income taxes. Debt may be state-noncontingent. The claim can be made more clear with the following two-step argument:
The first step is to realize that the set of implementable allocations under flexible prices is also implementable under sticky prices. This is clear once we show that in the model with flexible prices there are fiscal and monetary policies that induce the price level to be constant over time. Whatever are the restrictions on the setting of prices by firms that may be imposed, whether prices are set in advance or staggered, they won't be effective.
In the equilibria where the price level is constant over time, consumption taxes will have to move. They will move so that, for example, the Friedman rule of a zero nominal interest rate, may be consistent both with a positive, and varying, real interest rate and a constant price level. The price level gross of consumption taxes will have to decline at the real interest rate. If the government cannot use state contingent debt, the volatility of consumption taxes may also replicate state-contingent real debt in the same way as the volatility of the price level does precisely that in Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991) . The movements in the consumption tax will be compensated by movements in the labor income tax that implement the desired distortions between consumption and leisure.
Environments with different price setting restrictions thus share a common set of implementable allocations, the set of those allocations under flexible prices. Under sticky prices the sets are larger, including allocations associated with policies that do not neutralize the effects of the price setting restrictions. In these equilibria firms that face different price setting restrictions, but are otherwise identical, charge different prices. The second step is to show that those allocations are dominated in welfare terms by the set of implementable allocations under flexible prices. The result is an application of the principle in Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) that, even in a second best environment, it is not optimal to tax intermediate goods.
The set of implementable allocations in the economy with flexible prices is the one characterized by Lucas and Stokey (1983) or Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991) . Because this set is optimal under sticky prices we call it the frontier of implementable allocations. The common policies that implement those allocations induce a constant price level, under staggered prices, prices set in advance or flexible.
In extending the literature on optimal fiscal and monetary policy under flexible prices, as in Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991) , to environments with nominal rigidities, we conclude therefore, paradoxically, that those rigidities are irrelevant. This irrelevance in what concerns the allocations is straightforward. The Ramsey optimal allocation under sticky prices is the one that has been characterized in the flexible price literature. For example, the Friedman rule is optimal under sticky prices as under flexible prices, and uniform taxation is approximately optimal also under sticky prices. We also show that there are policies common to all the environments that implement the frontier of implementable allocations, independently of the price rigidity. However, these policies are not necessarily the ones that have been characterized in the flexible price literature. Under flexible prices there are policies that induce a constant price over time; but the same allocations can be decentralized with policies that induce a highly volatile price, which is costly under sticky prices.
The paper also extends the literature on optimal monetary policy under sticky prices by explicitly considering both fiscal and monetary policy. The benchmark in that literature (e.g. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), Rotemberg and Woodford 1997) is to assume that the government can tax lump sum to finance a subsidy to production that eliminates the mark up distortion. It also abstracts from the money demand distortion by assuming that the economy is in the limit non monetary. By replicating flexible prices it is possible to eliminate the only remaining distortion, the nominal rigidity, and achieve the first best.
Another class of papers, aiming to abstract from fiscal policy altogether, allow for lump sum taxes but not for distortionary taxes or subsidies (see Ireland (1996) , Adao, Correia and Teles (2003) , Khan, King and Wolman, 2003). Since it is no longer possible to eliminate the mark up distortion, the problem is then a second best problem, 1 and the solution is no longer trivial. Under flexible prices, the optimal monetary policy is to follow the Friedman rule, of zero nominal interest rates, resulting in a constant distortion. Under sticky prices it is possible to implement variable proportionate distortions around the average mark up distortion. In Adao, Correia and Teles (2003) , that policy is the optimal policy, improving upon the flexible price optimal allocation. 2 As we show in this paper, the reason for that result is the restriction that distortionary fiscal instruments are not available. If they were, the optimal allocation would be the same under flexible or sticky prices.
The closest related work is by Siu (2004) , Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Benigno and Woodford (2003) . They address the same issue but make one major different assumption on the available policy instruments, that leads to very different qualitative conclusions, even if quantitatively similar. While we assume that both consumption and labor income taxes can be used, Siu (2004) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) assume that only labor income taxes are available and Benigno and Woodford (2003) assume that only consumption taxes are. As a result it is no longer possible to implement under sticky prices the set of allocations under flexible prices, in particular because they also assume that debt is not state contingent. 3 Our paper also builds on Adao, Correia and Teles (2004) , where it is argued that the policies that decentralize either the flexible price, wage or portfolio allocations are independent of the degree of the rigidity. They conclude that if the objective of policy was to replicate the allocation under full flexibility, then the strength of the monetary transmission mechanism would be irrelevant.
An immediate positive implication of the results in this paper is that the identification of the degree or type of price stickiness using aggregate data may be a difficult, or even impossible, task. Even if the government does not follow the Ramsey policy, as long as it is choosing along the frontier of implementable allocations, then the data generated by the different models will be silent on the degree or type of the price stickiness. The equilibrium will share the characteristics of both flexible prices and sticky prices. Prices will be constant over time, but the quantities will be the ones that would be achieved under flexible prices.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we describe the model. Prices are assumed to be set in a staggered fashion as in Calvo (1983) . In Section 3 we characterize the sets of implementable allocations and policies. We show that the degree of rigidity is irrelevant in determining both allocations and policies. In Section 4, we show that the equivalence results are robust to alternative price setting restrictions. Section 5 contains the conclusions.
The model
We consider a standard real business cycles model with labor only to which we add restrictions on monetary transactions and the setting of prices. The agents are identical households, a continuum of firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], and a government. Each firm produces a distinct, perishable consumption good. The production uses labor, according to a linear technology. Firms set prices in a staggered fashion as in Calvo (1983) . 0 ≤ α < 1 is the probability of being restricted from setting prices, so that α = 0 corresponds to the case of flexible prices.
Each good i can be used for consumption as a cash good, c Government purchases are exogenous and the available tax instruments are consumption taxes τ c t , taxes on labor income τ n t , and taxes on profits τ π t , that may be state-contingent. Money supply and nominal interest rates are also state-contingent. We will restrict public nominal debt to be of one period maturity and to be state-noncontingent.
The following are natural restrictions on the policy instruments: If the gross nominal interest rates were less than one, R t < 1, it would be possible to make arbitrarily large profits issuing debt and holding money. If τ c t ≤ −1, the consumers would be able to purchase an arbitrarily large amount of consumption. If τ n t ≥ 1, labor supply would be zero. If τ π t > 1, it would be optimal for the households to dispose of profits. Therefore, the following restrictions apply to the nominal interest rates and tax rates:
We will assume that profits are fully taxed, τ π t = 1; and that initial wealth is zero, which is equivalent to assuming that it is also fully taxed. 4 The justification for full taxation of both profits and initial wealth is that those taxes are lump sum. The assumption also significantly simplifies the analysis.
The period t vector of aggregate productivity and government expenditure shocks is denoted by s t = [A t , G t ] ∈ S t , and the history of these shocks up to period t, or state at t, (s 0 , s 1 , ..., s t ), is denoted by s t ∈ S t . The initial realization s 0 is given. To simplify the exposition, we assume that the history of shocks has a discrete distribution.
Households The households have preferences described by
where
The households start period t with wealth W t , and decide to buy money balances M t . They also buy riskless nominal bonds B h t that pay R t B h t units of money one period later; and B h t,t+1 units of state-contingent nominal securities, in zero net supply, that pay one unit of money at the beginning of period t + 1 in a particular state, and cost Q t,t+1 in units of money at time t, normalized by the conditional probability of occurrence of the state. Thus,
4 Even if profits and intial wealth are fully taxed, those revenues are not sufficient to finance government expenditures. The full taxation of initial wealth eliminates the liabilities of the government. The full taxation of profits allows to subsidize production to eliminate the mark up distortion. It is still necessary to collect revenues to finance government expenditures, as under perfect competition.
The results do not change if we assume that profits and initial wealth are not fully taxed (see Correia, Nicolini and Teles, 2002) .
At the end of the period, the households receive the labor income W t N t , where W t is the nominal wage and N t = 1 − h t is total labor, and the profits from the firms Π(i) t , which are fully taxed. If we let p t (i) be the price of good i in units of money, the evolution of nominal wealth is governed by
together with a no-Ponzi games condition. The budget constraints, in each period t and state s t , can be written as
where P t is the price level,
and Q t,t+s = Q s j=0 Q t+j,t+1+j , Q t,t = 1. Money, M t , is used to purchase consumption of the cash good, C 1 t , according to the cash-in-advance constraint
The first order conditions of the households problem include the private demand of good i, whether cash or credit, as a function of its relative price and aggregate demand,
The marginal rate of substitution between consumption of the credit good and leisure is equated to the real wage, distorted by the consumption and labor income taxes,
The nominal interest rate distorts the marginal choice of cash and credit goods,
The optimal choice of riskless and state-contingent nominal assets implies the intertemporal conditions,
)
( 1 2 ) Replacing in the budget constraints (5), satisfied with equality, the intertem- (11) and the cash-inadvance constraint (7) with equality, and using the intratemporal conditions (9) and (10), we obtain the following equilibrium conditions
where the initial wealth is zero,
Government The government must finance an exogenous path of government purchases {G t } ∞ t=0 , such that
where g t (i) are government expenditures in good i. Given the prices on each good i, p t (i), the government minimizes expenditure on government purchases by deciding according to
The government budget constraints can be obtained from (5), taking into account the resource constraints to be specified later. A government policy consists of a sequence of exogenous government purchases, G t , money supplies, M t , nominal interest rates, R t , taxes, τ Firms Each firm i has the production technology
where y t (i) is the production of good i and A t is the aggregate technology shock. y t (i) can be used for private consumption of both cash and credit goods and public consumption, so that y
We will analyze the case where firms set prices in a staggered fashion as in Calvo (1983) but it will become apparent that the results extend to any conceivable price setting restrictions. In Calvo (1983) , every period a firm is able to revise the price with probability 1 − α > 0. The case α = 0 corresponds to the case of flexible prices. Since there is a continuum of firms, 0 ≤ α < 1 is the share of firms that are not able to revise the prices. The firms that are able to revise the price in some period t ≥ 0 choose p * t (i) to maximize the nominal value of profits
taking the demand function
as given, where (17) is obtained from (8) and (15) .
as well as the production function (16). The demand function
These firms set a common price equal to a constant mark-up over a weighted average of present and future marginal costs
where the weights are η t,j =
. This implies
( 1 9 ) Notice that for the case where α = 0, corresponding to flexible prices, η t,0 = 1, so that all the firms set prices equal to a constant mark up over the contemporaneous marginal cost,
At . This implies that the real wage w t = Wt Pt under flexible prices is
In general, the price level, P t , from (6) , is such that
where $ j is the share of firms that have set prices j periods before, $ j = (α) j (1 − α), j = 0, 2, ..., t , and $ t+1 = (α) t+1 , which is the share of firms that have never set prices, so that they charge an exogenous price p *
Market clearing The market clearing conditions for each good i are
Using the demand functions (8) and (15), these constraints can be added up as
The term
di is a measure of the production inefficiency resulting from the relative price distortions between firms that are identical except for the price setting restrictions.
Since the firms that are able to change prices set a common price, these conditions can be written as
In the case of flexible prices, α = 0, because firms are homogeneous in that environment the feasibility conditions are the familiar feasibility conditions
The market clearing conditions for the nominal debt markets are
The following is a definition of an equilibrium for 0 ≤ α < 1 for aggregate variables and the prices {p * t } ∞ t=0 .
Definition 1 An equilibrium is an allocation {C
and policies
such that (E1) the following households' first order conditions hold
(E2) the budget constraints (13) are satisfied for
E3) the cash in advance constraints (7) hold with equality
(E4) the pricing equations for the firms are
which imply (19) , so that under flexible prices,
(E5) the feasibility conditions are
which under flexible prices become
(E6) the price level is given by
which is always satisfied under flexible prices.
The equilibrium values for {c
, are obtained with the demands for each good i,given by (8) and (15) . The prices of the individual firms,
, are such that p(i) t = p * t−j if firm i was able to set the price in period t − j, 0 ≤ j ≤ t + 1.
are obtained with (26) and (27). The prices of the state-contingent debt in zero net supply, Q t,t+1 , are given by (12).
Implementable allocations and policies
In this section we characterize the sets of implementable allocations and policies for different degrees of price rigidity described by 0 ≤ α < 1, the share of firms that are not able to revise the price in period t ≥ 0. We start by analyzing the case where this share is zero, α = 0, which is the case of flexible prices. We show that the set of implementable allocations under flexible prices corresponds to the set of implementable allocations in Lucas and Stokey (1983) 
Implementable allocations and policies under flexible
prices.
In the following proposition we characterize the sets of implementable allocations and policies under flexible prices.
Proposition 1 (1) Under flexible prices, the set of implementable allocations for the consumption goods and leisure,
, is characterized by the implementability condition
the restriction that the nominal interest rate must be nonnegative
and the feasibility conditions (36).
is implemented with a unique path for the nominal interest rate, proportionate tax distortion and real wage
Given the initial money supply, M 0 , there is also a unique solution for
Proof: The implementability condition (38) is condition (31) for t = 0. The equilibrium conditions restricting the variables
in the environment with flexible prices are conditions E1, E2 and E3 in Definition 1 of an equilibrium, in addition to the flexible price versions of conditions E4 through E6 of the definition.
We will now show that the only restrictions on the allocations
are the implementability and feasibility conditions, (38), (39) and (36). The other equilibrium conditions restrict the remaining variables, {w t , R t , τ
The price setting equations in E4, (34), determine uniquely the real wages,
)P 0 is determined using the cash-in-advance constraint (32). Let Φ t be the number of states in period t, with Φ 0 = 1. For t ≥ 1, given the values for (1 + τ c t−1 )P t−1 and M t−1 , there are Φ t−1 + Φ t intertemporal and budget constraints, (30) and (31)to determine Φ t + Φ t−1 variables, the price levels gross of consumption taxes and the state-noncontingent debt levels, (1 + τ c t )P t and B g t−1 . The sequence of money supplies is determined using the cash in advance constraints, (32).
The implementability and feasibility constraints are the same as in the perfect competition case. The government is therefore able to decentralize the same allocation as in that case. In fact the revenues from the profit tax are enough to subsidize production, or labor, to eliminate the mark up distortion. The revenue from the profit tax is the full amount of profits Π t = ³ P t − Wt A t´A t (1 − h t ). Using the price setting condition of the flexible price firms P t = θ (θ−1)
This revenue is sufficient to decrease the tax on labor, τ n t , by a constant amount, 1 (θ−1) , so that 1 + τ n t is reduced by θ (θ−1) , which is the mark up distortion.
Once we realize that a model with monopolistic competition but full taxation of profits is equivalent to one with perfect competition then the problem reduces to the one studied by Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991). Lucas and Stokey (1983) consider that the policy instruments are a state-contingent labor income tax and state-contingent debt. Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991) show that without state-contingent debt it is possible to achieve the same set of allocations.
In fact, it is clear from the proof of Proposition 1, that one of the taxes is a redundant policy instrument. Given the initial money supply, M 0 , there are two restrictions on the variables τ c t , τ n t , P t , for each date and state, the equilibrium values of (1 + τ c t )P t and (1+τ c t ) (1−τ n With the two taxes, each allocation in the set of implementable allocations is implemented with multiple tax policies, each one associated with a different path for the price level. One of the multiple paths induces a constant price level over time. This result, stated in the following lemma, is key for the equivalence results in this paper.
Lemma 1 Under flexible prices, each allocation in the set of implementable allocations for the consumption goods and leisure,
, can be implemented by a policy that induces a a price level that is constant over time, equal to some number, P t = p s 0 . Given an initial money supply, M 0 , the policy is unique.
Proof: Consider an allocation
in the set defined by the implementability and feasibility conditions, (38), (39), and (36). From part (2) of Proposition 1, we know that, given M 0 , the two taxes, τ c t , τ n t and the price level, P t , are restricted by two restrictions, the values of (1+τ c t ) (1−τ n t ) and (1 + τ c t )P t , for each date and state. The path for the price level is unrestricted, and therefore it can be set equal to an arbitrary number, P t = p s 0 . Given M 0 , there is a unique solution for the policy variables and prices.¥ When the price level is constant over time, the consumption tax is performing the two roles that we mentioned above the price level would be playing, if there was only one tax. The consumption tax will have to move over time and across states. It will move so that the movements in the expected growth of the price level gross of taxes match the desired nominal and real interest rate paths. Furthermore, it will also have to move in order to replicate state-contingent real debt.
The second role, of replicating state-contingent real debt, would of course be unnecessary if debt itself was state-contingent. If that was the case then the consumption tax would not have to respond to contemporaneous shocks. It would still however have to move in response to lagged information so that the expected gross inflation is consistent with both the nominal and real interest rates. Even with state contingent debt, unless the consumption tax is available it is not possible to implement the set of allocations with a constant price level.
In Lucas and Stokey (1983) , where the policy instruments are one tax and state-contingent debt, it is noted that each allocation is associated with multiple money supply and price level paths. The path where the price level is constant is not one of those. This is obvious when we consider the Friedman rule that under certain conditions is the Ramsey optimal policy in their and our setup. 6 When the nominal interest rate is zero and real interest rate is positive, then the price level gross of the consumption tax must decline at that rate. If consumption taxes are not available, this is only possible if the price level declines.
Once we have established that under flexible prices there are policies that implement the whole set of allocations with a constant price level, it is straight-forward to see that independently of the price setting restrictions, those same policies will implement the same set under sticky prices. In the next section we show this and, furthermore, we show that that common set of allocations is optimal under sticky prices.
Implementable allocations and policies under sticky prices
We show that the set of implementable allocations under sticky prices, when α > 0, contains the set under flexible prices, when α = 0, characterized by (38), (39) and (36). We also show that the implementable set under flexible prices is a frontier of implementable allocations under sticky prices.
3.2.1
The set of implementable allocations under flexible prices is implementable under sticky prices with policies that do not depend on the price stickiness.
The first major point in the paper is the title of this section, that the set of implementable allocations under flexible prices is implementable under sticky prices. Furthermore, the policy is independent of the price stickiness. This is straightforward given Lemma 1. If the policy is the one characterized in that lemma, the price setting restrictions will be ineffective. The proposition follows:
Proposition 2 The set of implementable allocations under flexible prices is implementable under staggered price setting for any degree of price stickiness 0 ≤ α < 1, with policies that are also independent of the price stickiness.
Proof: Under staggered prices the equilibrium conditions are the same as under flexible prices except for the conditions in E4, E5 and E6, respectively for the price setting (33), the feasibility conditions (35) and the condition for the price level (37). Now suppose that the price level was constant and equal to the price of the firms that are restricted from ever changing prices P t = p s 0 . It is clear (from (19) ) that the individual firms must all set the same price p * t = p s 0 . In this case the price setting conditions and the feasibility conditions, irrespective of α > 0, collapse to the ones under flexible prices, respectively (34) and (36).
In this case the conditions in the two environments coincide. The conditions are the same as under flexible prices with the additional restriction that the price level is constant over time. Since there is one policy that under flexible prices keeps the price constant, the set of implementable allocations under sticky prices includes the set of allocations under flexible prices, defined by (38), (39), and (36).¥
The policy instruments needed to establish Lemma 1, and therefore the proposition above, are the two taxes, on consumption and labor income. Debt does not have to be state-contingent. The fact that the policy that implements each allocation with a constant price is unique, given the initial money supply, implies that all the policy instruments are essential. As mentioned before, allowing for state-contingent nominal debt would free the consumption tax from playing the role of replicating state-contingent real debt.
We have so far established that there are policies independent of the price rigidity that implement a set of allocations that is also independent of the price rigidity. The question we answer in the following section, is whether following those policies is the optimal thing to do when, as in this case, the price stickiness enlarges the set of implementable allocations.
3.2.2
The set of implementable allocations under flexible prices is a frontier of implementable allocations under sticky prices.
Under sticky prices, α > 0, the set of implementable allocations includes the implementable set under flexible prices, but it also includes allocations such that the relative prices between the firms that can change prices and the ones that cannot are distorted. We show that the common set of implementable allocations under flexible and sticky prices is a frontier of implementable allocations, that dominates for any 0 ≤ α < 1 the sets of allocations where relative prices between firms are distorted. Before stating the proposition we define a frontier of implementable allocations:
Definition 2 The frontier of implementable allocations is the subset of the set of implementable allocations such that given the values of any two of the final goods, the value of the other good is maximized.
(38) and (39), (33), (35), and (37). To see this notice that the term
, that measures the relative price distortion, is minimized subject to the equation for the price level (37) when
In this case, from (19) , the real wage will be as under flexible prices, (34).¥ If the preferences of the government depend only on
, then it is optimal to conduct policy so that the prices are equated across firms. The price level does not change over time, as under sticky prices, and the mark ups are constant, 
is thus characterized by (38), (39), and (36), as when prices are fully flexible. The frontier is the same independently of the degree of stickiness 0 ≤ α < 1.
The result is an application of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) optimal rules according to which it is not optimal to distort production in a second best environment. In fact the policies that do not neutralize the effects of the price rigidity, are equivalent to policies under flexible prices where firms are taxed in a discriminating way. To see this we consider fictitious firm specific taxes. 7 In an artificial environment where the government could use discriminating taxes on the production of each good i, τ t (i), the firm i that would be able to adjust the price at time t would choose p * t (i) to maximize profits
subject to the demand function (17) . The solution of this problem is
, so that the firms, when allowed to do so, would not necessarily set the same price. The prices could be different across firms both because they would set prices at different dates and because they would be taxed differently. The feasibility conditions and the expression for the price level would be the general expressions (23) and the expression for the price level, (6) , that we repeat here, respectively 7 We thank a referee for this interpretation of the results and alternative procedure to show them.
The equilibrium conditions can be summarized, as before, in the following way: The equilibrium variables
are restricted by the implementability condition as under flexible prices (38), the zero bound condition for the nominal interest rate (39), the price setting conditions (19) , the feasibility conditions (41), and the equations for the price level (42).
As before, where the prices differed because they were set at different dates, it is clear that the expression for the distortion in the feasibility condition (41), One way to implement this solution is to set the same taxes across goods and to follow the policy described before where prices are constant over time.
There are multiple ways of implementing this solution when α > 0. Not so under flexible prices, where α = 0. In that case, the only way to implement this is to set the taxes equal across firms. When that is the policy the price setting equation (19) becomes
which, together with the intratemporal condition (9) gives
The level of the tax on production common to all the goods is not uniquely pinned down. It is equivalent to tax all the intermediate goods at the same rate or the final good (or labor income). The issue is whether the production taxes should tax the goods differently. Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) have showed that, in this constant returns to scale set up, intermediate goods should be taxed at the same rate. Monetary policy that does not neutralize the price rigidity and generates different prices across goods that are identical except for the price setting restrictions is a particular way of setting different taxes across different goods.
In this fictitious environment with discriminating taxes, the sets of implementable allocations under flexible and sticky prices would coincide. Under flexible prices the frontier requires the firm specific taxes to be the same across goods. Under sticky prices one policy that is consistent with the frontier will have those taxes be equated across goods and the price level constant over time.
4 Alternative price setting restrictions and policy instruments.
We have assumed that the tax instruments are both consumption and labor income taxes and that debt is state non-contingent. With these instruments, the set of implementable allocations under flexible prices can be implemented with policies that keep prices constant over time. Once this is clear, it is straightforward to see that, those same policies implement the same set of allocations whatever are the price setting restrictions. We have shown it for Calvo (1983) staggered price setting but it is obvious that it applies to any conceivable price setting restrictions, whether Taylor (1983) , Rotemberg (1982) , Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999), or prices set in advance as in Ireland (1996) or Adao, Correia and Teles (2003) .
In the cases of Calvo (1983) where each firm may be restricted to set prices for many periods, possibly forever, Taylor (1983) , where firms set prices in a staggered fashion for more than one period, Rotemberg (1982) where there costs of changing prices, or state dependent pricing of Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999), the policies that neutralize the price setting restrictions are exactly those that keep the price constant over time. The instruments we have assumed so far are the ones necessary to achieve that. Given a policy variable for the initial period, the policy path that implements each allocation is unique.
The consumption tax plays two fundamental roles. It substitutes for the intertemporal movements in prices that are consistent with a desired path for both the nominal and real interest rates. It also performs the role of replicating state contingent debt. If the government could issue state-contingent debt, the consumption tax would not have to play this second role. It could be less volatile, not having to respond to contemporaneous information. The two taxes would still be necessary, though, since the consumption tax would still have to play the first role.
If the price setting restrictions were less severe, as when prices are set in advance, a policy that keeps prices constant over time may be excessively restricted. For example, if a share of firms were to set prices one period in advance, in order to neutralize that restriction it would be enough that policy induce the price level not to respond to contemporaneous information. This imposes less restrictions on policy and therefore less instruments are required to accomplish it. In this case, the frontier could be achieved with only one tax as long as debt was state-contingent. The consumption tax would not be necessary because debt would be state-contingent and because movements in the price level in response to lagged information would be costless.
In the extreme case of flexible prices the frontier is implementable without restrictions on the price level. As we saw before there are multiple policies that implement each allocation, so much so that one of the taxes is redundant even without state-contingent debt. This point, that the set of implementable allocations under flexible prices can be achieved with one tax and state-noncontingent debt, was made by Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991). Because of missing instruments, in neither of these models the set of implementable allocations under flexible prices is implementable under sticky prices. However, while in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) the missing instrument is the consumption tax, in the other two papers it would be possible to implement the frontier with only one tax and state-contingent debt. In Siu (2004) because prices are set in advance the first role of the consumption tax can be played by the price level, while in Benigno and Woodford (2003) the nominal interest rate is not pinned down and therefore there is no first role for the consumption tax.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we analyze the implications of nominal rigidities for the conduct of fiscal and monetary policy in response to shocks. We consider standard stochastic general equilibrium models that differ in the price setting restrictions imposed on the firms. We show that independently of the type or degree of price stickiness it is possible to implement the same efficient set of allocations, and that each allocation in that set is implemented with policies that are also invariant to that same characteristic of the environment.
Policy shocks have differing effects in the model economy depending on the type and degree of price rigidity. Similarly, the exogenous shocks to technology and government expenditures, also affect the economy differently depending on the type and degree of price rigidity. We show that when policy satisfies a minimum requirement of optimality, the combined effect of the exogenous shocks and the response of policy is such that the allocations that can be implemented and the policies that implement them do not depend on the price rigidity. The price rigidity is irrelevant, or in other words, environments with different types or degrees of price rigidity are equivalent.
Whether prices are sticky or flexible, fiscal and monetary policy is conducted so that the economies behave like economies where prices are sticky, but they also behave like economies where prices are flexible. Prices are constant over time because firms may set prices in a staggered fashion as in Calvo (1983) , but mark ups are also constant, as under flexible prices.
The equivalence results on the allocations, that these do not depend on the type and degree of price rigidity, imply that the results on the optimal allocations in the Ramsey literature under flexible prices as in Lucas and Stokey (1983) , Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991), or Zhu (1992) , hold also under sticky prices. Instead, the results in that literature on the optimal policies do not necessarily extend to environments with sticky prices. The polices that implement the frontier under sticky prices can be used under flexible prices but the reverse is not true. The set of polices that decentralize each allocation in the frontier is larger under flexible prices than when a share of firms sets prices in advance, and that it still a smaller set when prices are set in a staggered fashion.
In Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991), because debt is not state-contingent, the optimal policy generates high volatility of the price level in order to replicate real state-contingent debt. This policy would be costly under sticky prices. The policy that is common to all environments substitutes high volatility of the consumption tax for the high volatility of the price level. Another example: The Friedman rule is a robust result in the flexible price environments, implying that the price level gross of consumption taxes must decline at the real rate of interest. Under flexible prices that can be achieved with movements of the price level, while under sticky prices it would have to be associated with movements in the tax rate.
We use minimal sets of instruments to obtain the results of equivalence of environments. In particular, we show that state-contingent debt is a redundant policy instrument as long as both consumption and labor income taxes are available.
We have assumed that profits and initial wealth are fully taxed. Because those taxes are lump sum, they ought to be used fully, so that the frontier of allocations may be implemented. That assumption also considerably simplifies the analysis, without significantly affecting the results. The equivalence results still hold for arbitrary values of those taxes (see Correia, Nicolini and Teles, 2002) .
The results in this paper are based on the assumption that tax rates can be state-contingent, which is the standard assumption in the literature. It is immediate to see that if there are institutional reasons that impose lags in the decision or implementation of taxes, then the set of implementable allocations will be restricted, the set will be dependent on the degree of stickiness, and the equivalence results will be lost.
It may still be the case that the Ramsey optimal allocation and the policies that implement it are the same across environments concerning the price stickiness. Under particular conditions on preferences and technology, the optimal allocation under flexible prices is characterized by constant proportionate distortions. In that case, if debt was state-contingent, it would be possible to implement the optimal allocation under staggered prices, with consumption and labor income taxes that are set one period in advance (see Correia, Nicolini and Teles, 2002) . The policy would also be invariant to the type and degree of price stickiness.
The equivalence of environments would also be lost if we were to consider idiosyncratic productivity shocks, since the results hinge on the reaction of aggregate policies to aggregate shocks.
A final remark: We consider, as most of this literature, models with sticky prices where the degree of price stickiness is exogenous. This is not a natural assumption when computing the efficient, or optimal, policies because the price setting restrictions will in general depend on the policy. Considering this would be irrelevant, if, as we show, policy does not depend on those restrictions.
